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ABSTRACT: Earnings management has become an important topic in accounting 
and finance in recent decades. This practice is possible due the existence of 
alternative accounting criteria for recognition, measurement and/or demonstration of 
earnings, creating opportunities for managers to choose one of the available options 
in order to reflect information in the desired form. This can sometimes distort the 
analysis of the company’s performance. There are various ways to manipulate 
accounting information. This paper investigates whether there was earnings 
management in Brazil through deferral of losses due to exchange rate variations in 
1999 and 2001, as well as through the respective amortization of these losses in 
following years. We analyze the companies that carried out such deferral in one or 
both years, and the respective amortization from 1999 to 2003, utilizing histograms 
and nonparametric methods, and find strong indications that the companies that 
chose such deferral did so to manage their earnings, in order to avoid showing 
decreased earnings or even losses. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
he information approach within accounting research has made an important 
contribution in the past few decades (LOPES, 2002; LOPES and MARTINS; 2005). 
The works on accounting in the positive line of research under an opportunistic 
perspective formulate their hypotheses under the optic of WATTS and 
ZIMMERMAN; (1986): 
 
a. Incentive plan hypothesis – the assumption that the existence of conflicts of interest 
between agent and principal, based on the theory of contracts, can influence the quality of 
decisions and lead to attempts to maximize personal rather than company welfare. This fact 
leads to the formulation on incentive plans based on accounting information. Thus, executives 
can make opportunistic decisions on accounting procedures, seeking to meet desired targets 
that bear on their compensation. 
 
b. Debt/equity hypothesis – the assumption that the higher the indebtedness quotient, the 
greater are the incentives for executives to choose accounting criteria that improve the 
company’s performance. This practice is mainly observed when there are debt covenants that 
impose certain financial restrictions on the company. 
 
c. Political cost hypothesis – the assumption that political considerations “induce political 
behavior in determined companies’ choice of accounting procedures” (IUDICIBUS and 
LOPES; p.25). This means to say that the companies most watched by other agents tend of 
choose their accounting practices so as to transfer present profits to the future, reducing their 
political costs. 
 
It is important to mention that the opportunistic perspective arises after the 
establishment of contractual mechanisms (ex post). 
Various lines of positive research in accounting have gained space in the national and 
international literature. After the recent corporate scandals, the question of manipulation of 
accounting results has become more relevant. This manipulation has been given many names, 
the two most common being earnings management and creative accounting. Although the 
name may largely be a question of semantics, we feel that the second expression does not best 
describe the purpose here, because the use of the word “creative” may correspond more to 
improvement of accounting information than its manipulation (CARDOSO; 2004). According 
to Healy and Wahlen (1999, p. 368): 
 
“Earnings management occurs when managers use judgment in financial 
reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either 
mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the 
company or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported 
accounting numbers” 
The possibility of distorting accounting information normally originates from the 
existence of alternative criteria for recognition, measurement and/or demonstration within the 
accounting system, creating opportunities for administrators to choose one of the valid 
alternatives in order to depict information in the desired way and distorting the analysis of 
company performance. 
T 
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Deliberations 294/99, 404/01 and 409/01 from the Comissão de Valores Mobiliários 
(CVM, the Brazilian Securities Commission), allowed companies to defer losses resulting 
from extraordinary exchange rate variations in 1999 and 2001. This enabled some companies 
that suffered losses because of currency variations in these years to defer them and thus 
present more desirable accounting results. 
Against this backdrop, the question analyzed by this article is as follows: Is there 
evidence of earnings management by the companies that deferred exchange rate losses, in  
such a way that it significantly changed their earnings results? 
This question is addressed through an empirical study to verify whether the earnings 
alterations through deferral of currency variation losses by these companies were significant  
or not. 
To answer this question, we conducted tests of hypotheses about the differences in the 
results, with and without deferral of exchange rate losses, in 1999 and 2001, as well as on the 
effects of the respective amortizations on earnings in subsequent years. To do this we 
employed histogram analysis and nonparametric tests. The accounting information was 
obtained from the database of the Institute for Accounting, Actuarial and Financial Research 
(Fipecafi), used in the company rankings of the magazine Melhores e Maiores (“Best and 
Biggest”), for the period 1999 to 2003. This information is limited to the largest 500 firms by 
turnover. 
This work is an exploratory survey intended to obtain more concrete knowledge, 
incorporating characteristics not clearly explicit, as well as seeking to shed light on unknown 
dimensions (BEUREN, 2003) that need to be better understood. The empirical exercises are 
based on a bibliographical study of the theoretical references, to enable an analysis and 
interpretation of the existing scientific contributions on the theme, especially in books, theses, 
dissertations and articles, both national and international. 
We do not discuss the theoretical questions on earnings management (manipulation of 
accounting information) and the main fundamentals and concepts of accountancy, or the 
accounting treatment to be adopted for such losses, since these themes have already been 
debated in various works (MARTINS, 2001; MARTINEZ, 2002; SZUSTER, 2002; 
SZUSTER and SZUSTER, 2003), besides being outside the scope of this study. 
 
2. DEFERRAL OF EXCHANGE RATE LOSSES 
 
Brazil suffered from years of high inflation until the Real Plan in 1994 finally 
stabilized the new currency, of the same name. At this point the Real was loosely tied to the 
dollar, in what financial analysts call a “sliding peg” regime, meaning the exchange rate was 
allowed to fluctuate within a narrow trading band that was gradually adjusted to reflect 
changes in relative currency values. However, by late 1998, Brazil’s currency was considered 
by most analysts to be significantly overvalued and began to come under increasing pressure. 
After expending large sums of reserves to defend the Real, the government finally relented, 
and on January 13, 1999 the Brazilian Central Bank widened the trading band. But the market 
did not react positively, and in the following days the government decided to do away with  
the bands entirely and float Brazil’s currency. The result was a steep devaluation against the 
dollar, which in January alone reached 64%. The maximum quotation to buy dollars occurred 
on March 3, 1999, when the exchange rate was US$1 = R$ 2.1639 (a devaluation of 
approximately 79%), later strengthening to US$ = R$ 1.7212 at the end of March, an 
accumulated devaluation of 42% in the first quarter. For the entire calendar year, the 
devaluation against the dollar was 48%, while inflation was only 8.43% (according to the 
consumer price index). 
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In this situation, the Brazilian Institute of Independent Auditors (IBRACON), until 
then called the Brazilian Institute of Accountants, issued Circular Letter 01 on January 20, 
1999, emphasizing that the effects of the exchange rate variation caused by the maxi- 
devaluation would not engender any type of adjustment in financial statements as at  
December 31, 1998, and recommended inclusion of explanatory notes, in this respect, 
following the orientation of International Accounting Standard 10 (IAS 10) issued by the 
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB). 
Regarding the accounting treatment for 1999, the federal government issued 
Provisional Measure 1818 on March 25, 1999 (transformed into Law 9816/1999)
1
, permitting 
companies to defer any losses from the exchange rate variation. 
To do this, companies could book, in a deferred asset account, the net negative result  
of the local currency value of obligations and credits in foreign currency because of the 
devaluation in the first quarter of 1999. This deferral then had to be amortized at a rate of at 
least 25% per calendar year as of that same year, 1999. This deferral was exclusively for 
purposes of the financial statements, because for calculation of income tax and social 
contribution on profit
2
, any exchange rate losses had to be fully recognized in the first quarter 
of 1999 (for firms using the real profit reporting method) or in the fiscal year (for those using 
annual calculation). 
Nevertheless, IBRACON Technical Communiqué 02, of April 5, 1999, advised  
against the total or partial deferral of exchange rate variation, recommending that these should 
be recognized as revenues or expenses in the same period as they occurred. If a company 
chose deferral, IBRACON recommended that the auditor should issue the respective opinion 
with reservations about the financial statements for that period. 
CVM Deliberation 294/1999 also permitted the exceptional procedure of postponing 
recognition of the negative net result of exchange rate changes in the first quarter of 1999 and 
established that these losses were to be amortized linearly in up to four years, as of 1999. 
During the second half of 2001, there was another sharp devaluation of Brazil’s 
currency, and once again the federal government, through Provisional Measure 03 of 
September 26. 2001 (converted into Law 10,305/2001), allowed companies (other than 
financial institutions) to carry out the same deferral. In 2001, the accumulated currency 
devaluation was 18.7%, compared with inflation (consumer price index) of 9.44%. 
Seeing a need to regulate the question for publicly traded companies, the Securities 
Commission (CVM) issued Deliberation 404 on September 27, 2001, stipulating that the net 
result of exchange rate variation in 2001, whether negative or positive, should as a general  
rule pass through the statement of income for the year. However, exceptionally, it held that 
this net result, if negative, could be deferred and booked as a deferred asset, to be amortized  
in the following four years. 
Then, on November 1 that year, the CVM amended this through Deliberation 404, 
ruling that such amortization would have to start that same year. In practical terms, this new 
ruling allowed deferring only 75% of the net exchange rate losses for 2001. 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
A provisional measure is an executive decree, with standing as ordinary law, that goes into effect immediately 
upon publication but is subject to subsequent approval or rejection by Congress. If approved, it is converted into  
a regular law. 
2  
The Brazilian government raises revenue mainly through taxes per se and contributions, the difference being 
that the latter are earmarked for specific programs while the former go into the general fund (also subject to 
constitutionally mandated set-asides). 
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3. EARNINGS MANAGEMENT 
 
Despite all efforts to develop accounting techniques to reach the goals of offering 
better quality information that accurately depicts a company’s situation, there is  still  
situations were administrators try intentionally to distort the accounting reports to satisfy 
specific needs of the company or themselves. As stated earlier, the existence of multiple 
standards and criteria allows top managers to choose alternatives seeking to present financial 
statements to serve specific ends, hampering a fair analysis of company performance. 
The disclosure of losses or earnings lower than expected by investors and analysts, 
among others, can bring undesirable effects, normally associated with eroded investor 
confidence. Furthermore, in many companies, executives’ performance incentives (including 
compensation levels) are tied to accounting numbers. For this reason, there is always the 
possibility of managing the accounting results to avoid revealing poor performance, and there 
is a good deal of discretionary power to do so. 
According to Fields, Lys and Vicent (2001), the accounting choices probably exist 
because it is simply impossible or impractical to eliminate them. This accounting flexibility 
also reduces the temptation of executives to obtain desired results through real decisions 
(presumably more expensive). Hence, the choice could be part of an optimal solution to the 
agency problem, even when it leads to no information. 
There is no consensus among academics about the concept of earnings management. 
As mentioned earlier, Healy and Wahlen (1999, p. 368) consider it to occur when the 
executives use their discretionary judgment to manipulate the financial information to cast a 
better light on the company’s performance. According to Santos and Grateron (2003; p. 11), 
earnings management refers to the application of accounting rules to manipulate, “the figures 
in the statements as judged most convenient.” 
According to Davidson, Stickney and Weil (1987), cited by Schipper (1989, p. 92), 
earnings management is the process of decisions taken, within the limits of accounting 
standards, to present the desired earnings level. In the same work, Schipper (p. 92) expands 
the scope of study, stressing that “disclosure management rather than earnings management,  
is “purposeful intervention in the external financial reporting process, with the intent of 
obtaining some private gains”. 
The accounting literature contains evidence that executives behave opportunistically  
in various situations. Szuster (2002, p.57) points to many reasons for companies to defer or  
not defer their currency variation losses, “but these are hard to define, since companies with 
similar characteristics adopt different alternatives.” The option to defer such losses was not 
uniformly followed by companies, due to certain interests about the financial statements, 
which in part can be explained by the fact the devaluations of Brazil’s currency might well 
have caused different impacts on companies’ earnings and net equity, depending on their 
levels of exposure to currency value swings in either direction. 
The empirical studies on earnings management present a set of incentives for the agent 
(administrator) to act opportunistically in choosing the criteria for measurement and/or 
demonstration of results, such as avoiding disclosure of losses or disappointing earnings 
(DECHOW,   SLOAN   and   SWEENEY,   1995;   BURSTAHLER   and   DICHEV,    1997; 
MARTINEZ, 2001, 2004; FUJI, 2004), increasing executive compensation (HEALY and 
WAHLEN, 1999; BARTOV and MOHANRAM, 2004), or minimizing the variability of  
errors in predicting earnings to shareholders (BARTOV, GIVOLY and HAYN, 2002; 
MARTINEZ, 2002). 
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Among the incentives to manipulate accounting information that can have led some 
companies to defer currency variation losses are: 
 Pressure from various economic agents for better earnings; 
 The desire of executives to obtain higher compensation; and 
 The need to meet the indicators or parameters established in loan contracts (debt 
covenants). 
Some models have been developed to help the study of earnings management. Two of 
them are analysis of aggregate or specific accruals and histogram analysis. The analysis of 
accruals (aggregate and specific) is based on models depending on accrual basis accounting, 
which seeks to measure earnings in the economic sense, independently of the financial 
realization of transactions and events (DECHOW and DICHEW, 2002). These methods need 
to separate the accruals into: 
 Discretionary accruals – which are artificial and whose object is only to manipulate the 
accounting numbers; and 
 Nondiscretionary accruals – which are inherent to the company’s activities. 
 
So, the econometric models developed consider that discretionary accruals are a proxy 
for earnings management (HEALY, 1985; JONES, 1991, and KANG and 
SILVARAMAKRISHNAN, 1995). Although widely used in empirical research, the models 
based on accruals are criticized by some researchers, because they fail to distinguish between 
aggregate accruals resulting from changes in the economic climate and those from 
manipulation of accounting data (BENEISH, 2001). Hence, according to this argument, 
discretionary accruals are not good proxies for earnings management (BARTOV and 
MOHANRAM, 2004). 
An alternative to the use of aggregate accruals is to use sector-specific accruals 
according to the company’s activity, trying to verify which items are used for earnings 
management (MARTINEZ, 2001). The disadvantage of this disaggregated approach is the 
need for theoretical support based on the understanding of researchers and the analysis of how 
decision makers change the incentives associated with the accounting object under study. 
Besides this, its evidence is fragmented (FRANCIS, 2001). 
Another approach is to use frequency distributions (histogram analysis) to verify 
abnormal behaviors around reference points such as zero earnings, previous year’s earnings or 
expected earnings by financial analysts. The difficulty of this method is mainly in choosing 
the reference points, besides the fact they do not identify the magnitude of earnings 
management (MARTINEZ, 2001; TUKAMOTO, 2004). 
The approach employed here is based on analysis of histograms, because it is one of 
the most commonly used in empirical studies on earnings management and it allows a broad 
vision of the practices of manipulation of accounting information. 
 
4. DATA ANALYSIS 
 
As said before, this work relies on the list of the 500 largest companies of  the 
magazine Melhores e Maiores for 1999 and 2001. This ranking is based on annual turnover in 
U.S. dollars. From that list, 45 and 31 companies deferred currency variation losses in 1999 
and 2001, respectively. Of these, 12 companies deferred such losses in both years, 33 only in 
1999 and 19 only in 2001. Thus, from the sample utilized, 64 firms deferred exchange rate 
losses in 1999 or 2001, or both years. 
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Of the 45 companies from 1999, 17 were publicly traded corporations (38%), 19 
limited liability companies (42%), 6 closely held corporations (13%) and 3 cooperatives  
(7%). There were 9 firms in the food and beverage sector (21%), 7 in the steel and metallurgy 
sector (17%), 5 in the electricity sector (12%), and the others fell into diverse other sectors. In 
2001 there were 45 listed corporations (48%), 8 limited liability companies (26%), and 8 
closely held corporations (26%), of which 8 were in the electric power sector (27%), 7 in 
petrochemicals (24%) and the other scattered in various other sectors. 
To verify the normality of the variables used in this work, we applied the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) and Anderson-Darling (A-D) tests. According to these tests, the 
hypothesis of normality was rejected at a 0.05 significance level (p-value under 0.01), so we 
then employed nonparametric tests, which are more suitable for data that do not meet the 
presupposition of normality. The first hypothesis tested was whether there were significant 
differences in relation to the earnings of the companies with and without deferral. 
 
 
The large nominal differences between the values for net earnings, and consequently, 
net equity of the companies analyzed, due to their size differences hampered the adequate use 
and interpretation of the data. Therefore, we used return on equity to check the influences of 
deferral on the earnings presented by the companies. 
The Wilcoxon rank sum test (a nonparametric test) returned a p-value under 0.01, so 
with a significance level of 0.05 (α = 0.05). There are significant differences between the 
returns on equity with and without the effect of deferral of currency variation losses, in 1999. 
These differences can be observed in Graph 1, because the returns on net equity with the 
deferral effect have a greater number of companies with returns above zero compared with 
those that did not choose to defer. Besides this, there is a greater concentration of returns with 
deferral around the reference point (zero return), observed by the flattening (kurtosis) of the 
frequency distribution curves. 
H1 = The returns on equity in 1999 with and without deferral are not significantly 
different. 
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Graph 1 – Comparison of the return on equity with and without the effects of 
deferral in 1999 
 
Tables 1 and 2 below show that if the deferral had not been done, 80% of the 
companies (that chose deferral) would have had negative earnings in 1999, and three of them 
would have had negative net equity. With the deferral option, the percentage of companies 
with negative earnings in the period fell to 53.3% and none had negative net equity. This 
agrees with Graph 1, which leads to the conclusion that there is evidence of earnings 
management through deferral of losses from exchange rate variations in this period. 
 
Table 1 – Effect of deferral on net earnings in 1999 
 Without Deferral With Deferral 
Frequency % Frequency % 
Negative Earnings 
Positive Earnings 
36 
9 
80.0% 
20.0% 
24 
21 
53.3% 
46.7% 
 
Table 2 – Effect of deferral on net equity in 1999 
 Without Deferral With Deferral 
Frequency % Frequency % 
Negative Net Equity 
Positive Net Equity 
3 
42 
6.7% 
93.3% 
 
45 
 
100.0% 
 
We conducted a new test (second hypothesis) to check whether there were any 
significant differences regarding the earnings of the companies with and without deferral in 
2001, through return on equity. 
 
Deferral in 1999 
 
With Deferral Without Deferral 
30 
Coun2t0 
10 
0 
-4.5%      -3.8%       -3.0%       -2.3%      -1.5%      -0.8%       0.0% 0.8% -4.5%      -3.8%      -3.0%       -2.3%       -1.5%      -0.8%      0.0% 0.8% 
 
Return on Equity Return on Equity 
H2 = The returns on equity in 2001 with and without deferral are significantly different. 
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Using the same procedures as for 1999, we found that there is also evidence of 
earnings management through deferral of currency variation losses in 2001. 
 
Graph 2 – Comparison of the return on equity with and without the 
effects of deferral in 2001 
 
In Graph 2, return on equity with deferral, the results are more concentrated around  
the reference point (zero return) compared to those without deferral. This can be verified by 
the flattening of the frequency distribution curve, besides the presence of a larger number of 
companies with positive returns. Once again, the Wilcoxon test gave back a p-value less than 
0.01, and together with the graphical analysis, one can conclude that companies that deferred 
in 2001 were also significantly affected by this deferral. 
Tables 3 and 4 below show that if they had not deferred the exchange rate losses, 71% 
of the companies would have had negative earnings in 2001, and 7 of these firms would have 
had negative net equity as well. The choice to defer made the percentage of negative earnings 
in the period fall to 42% and only 3 companies had negative net equity. 
 
Table 3 – Effect of deferral on net earngings in 2001 
 Without Deferral With Deferral 
Frequency % Frequency % 
Negative Earnings 
Positive Earnings 
22 
9 
71.0% 
29.0% 
13 
18 
41.9% 
58.1% 
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Table 4 – Effect of deferral on net equity in 2001 
 Without Deferral With Deferral 
Frequency % Frequency % 
Negative Net Equity 
Positive Net Equity 
7 
24 
22.6% 
77.4% 
3 
28 
9.7% 
90.3% 
 
Another question that can be raised derives from the results presented by the previous 
tests: if the companies deferred exchange rate losses in 1999 and 2001, seeking to avoid (or 
minimize) accounting losses, how did these same companies amortize the deferral in 
subsequent years? The amortization in both cases, according to legislation, was to calculate it 
linearly in up to 4 years, counted from the year of deferral. But this was not exactly the only 
criterion the companies actually used for the respective amortizations. Graphs 3 and 4 show 
what the companies really did. 
 
 
Graph 3 – Amortization criteria of deferral done in 1999 
 
Graph 3 shows that only 29% of the companies that proceeded with the deferral in 
1999 amortized the losses in the 4 years (25% a year) according to established in legislation. 
But what stands out most is that 48% of the companies did not carry out linear amortization. 
Amortization Criterion 
- 1999 Deferral 
2 years (50%) 
3 years (33%) 
4 years (25%) 
Nonlinea 
15.91 
6.82 
47.73 
29.55 
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Graph 4 – Amortization criteria for deferral done in 2001 
 
Once again, in 2001 there is evidence that at the time of amortizing the deferred 
exchange rate losses, 61% of the companies did not use the linear criterion (Graph 4). This 
finding implies examining a third hypothesis: 
 
 
To verify what motivated these companies to use nonlinear amortization during the 
period, we analyzed its influence on the respective earnings results through the returns in the 
years after the deferrals effected in 1999 and 2001. 
Graph 5 (histogram) compares whether or not the companies were totally amortizing 
the exchange rate losses, according to a possible intention to present determined earnings 
results in 2000. Some of the companies that totally amortized their exchange rate losses by  
the end of 2000, as shown graphically below, presented approximately nil revenues with a 
certain normality in the frequency distribution. In contrast, the companies that did not totally 
amortize such losses by this year showed roughly zero earnings performance, but were totally 
dispersed over the frequency distribution. This fact leads to the conclusion that the adoption  
of different amortization criteria sought to avoid presenting negative accounting results or to 
reduce the variability of the results over the period, and that some firms did not have much 
chance to manage earnings because they had to recognize part of the exchange losses in the 
result for 2000. 
Amortization Criterion 
- 2001 Deferral 
2 years (50%) 
4 years (25%) 
Nonlinea 
19.35% 
61.29 
19.35 
H3 = The amortizations of the currency variation losses were used as a way to manage 
earnings by the companies. 
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Graph 5 – Comparison of the returns on net equity in 2000 – total or 
partial amortization 
 
Graph 6 reveals that some companies totally amortized by the end of 2001 the 
exchange rate losses from 1999 and other still had to amortize the remaining balance in 2002. 
Another finding is that the companies that deferred in 1999 and totally amortized the currency 
value losses by 2001 present a higher profitability concentration than the reference point (zero 
return), leading to the conclusion that they benefited from better results in the period to 
“unload” those losses and with this reduce the variability of their earnings over the period. 
 
Graph 6 – Comparison of the returns on net equity in 2001 – total of 
partial amortization 
Deferral in 1999 
 
Companies that amortized totally Companies with a balance to amortize 
15 
10 
Count 
5 
0 
-1.25    -1.00   -0.75    -0.50    -0.25    0.00    0.25     0.50    0.75 -1.25    -1.00   -0.75    -0.50    -0.25    0.00    0.25     0.50     0.75 
Return on Equity in 2000 Return on Equity in 2000 
Deferral in 1999 
 
Companies that amortized totally Companies with a balance to amortize 
10 
8 
 
 
Count 
6 
4 
2 
-1.00  -0.80  -0.60  -0.40  -0.20   0.00    0.20    0.40    0.60    0.80 -1.00  -0.80  -0.60  -0.40  -0.20   0.00    0.20    0.40    0.60   0.80 
Return on Equity in 2001 Return on Equity in 2001 
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However, regarding the amortization of currency variation losses in 2001, we found  
no behavior patterns, so there is no evidence of earnings management, as can be seen in 
Graphs 7 and 8. 
 
Graph 7 – Comparison of the returns on net equity in 2002 – total or 
partial amortization 
 
Graph 8 – Comparison of the returns on net equity in 2003 – total or 
partial amortization 
 
Hunt et al (1996) and Abarbanell and Lehavy (2001), cited by Barton and Simko 
(2002,  p.4),  found  that  because  of  the  natural  reversal  of  discretionary     accruals,     the 
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administrators who practice earnings management in a determined period are less able to 
repeat this in subsequent periods. In other words, if there are manipulations in a determined 
period to show satisfactory performance, normally in subsequent periods the difficulties to 
undertake similar operations are much greater. Dechow (1994) observes that part of the 
variation analyzed in the period by earnings management studies is expected by the reversal  
of the accruals of previous periods. It should be stressed that not every accrual is evidence of 
manipulation of accounting information. What must be examined is the atypical use of 
accruals, controlling for other economic and financial factors. 
Another question (hypothesis 4) raised here was to check whether there was some 
relationship between the accounting results presented in 2001 between the companies that 
deferred in both 1999 and 2001 and those that did so only in 1999. 
 
 
The majority of the companies that opted for deferral in 1999 managed to reverse the 
negative net earnings result by 2001, in relation to 1999. If the effects were disregarded of the 
deferral in the two years, the number of companies presenting negative net earnings in 2001 
would fall from 29 (in 1999) to 18 companies (Table 5), only considering those that chose to 
defer in 1999. Graph 9 shows that the profitability levels of the companies that chose to defer 
only in 1999 are more concentrated around a zero or a slightly negative return on equity. 
 
Table 05 – Net earnings (without deferral) of companies in 1999 
 Net Earnings in 1999 Net Earnings in 2001 
Frequency % Frequency % 
Negative Earnings 
Positive Earnings 
29 
4 
87.9% 
12.1% 
18 
15 
54.5% 
45.5% 
 
Graph 9 – Comparison of the returns on net equity in 2001 – companies 
that deferred in 1999 and 2001 and those that only deferred in 1999 
H4 = The companies that deferred only in 1999 presented more satisfactory results in 
2001. 
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It must not be forgotten that part of the choice to defer losses from foreign exchange 
variations in 2001 can be attributed, initially, to the absence of similarly relevant impacts on 
the results for the period. While in 1999 the currency devaluation was 48%, in 2001 it was 
only roughly 19%. To this must be added the fact that inflation in 1999 was 8% and in 2001 it 
was 9%. 
 
5. FINAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 
This work sought to find evidence of earnings management through manipulation of 
the losses caused by exchange rate variations in 1999 and 2001. Based on the tests of the 
hypotheses formulated, we found strong indications of earnings management by the 
companies that deferred these losses in 1999 and 2001. The option to defer aimed to reduce 
the variability of the accounting results, and mainly to avoid reporting negative earnings in 
these years. We also found that some companies, if they had not deferred these losses, would 
have presented negative net equity. 
Even though the legislation issued by the accounting regulatory entities, mainly the 
CVM, indicates that the amortization of the losses was to be done linearly in up to four years, 
counted from the year of deferral itself, the majority of the companies analyzed did this 
nonlinearly. After analyzing the reflections of the loss amortizations on the results from 1999 
to 2003, we found that failure to follow the linear amortization rule was due to the fact that  
the companies used the recognition of these losses in the result for the period according to 
their particular interest in showing economic performances. 
We also found that part of the companies that chose to defer in 1999 did not do so 
again in 2001. It should be observed that the smaller currency devaluation this year and the 
presentation of positive results by the companies likely contributed to a large extent to the 
decision not to defer again. 
Finally, to meet the objectives of this study, we presented evidence that for some 
companies the earnings management by deferring currency variation losses in 1999 and 2001 
implied significant changes in their disclosure of accounting information. 
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